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Inter/Multimedial Constructions of
Islam in Post-9/11 TV Series: The
West Wing and 24
Brigitte Georgi-Findlay
1 Since  The  West  Wing (NBC,  1999-2006),  the  genre  of  the  political  drama  series  has
become  a  proliferating  format  for  fictional  engagements  with  American  politics
(domestic and foreign) and with the U.S. presidency (24,  Commander in Chief,  Scandal,
House of Cards, Designated Survivor), vice presidency (Veep), or the office of secretary of
state (Political Animals, Madam Secretary).1 Especially after 9/11, public narratives about
Islam and Islamophobia have resonated also within these series. However, while there
is an extensive body of scholarship on the impact of 9/11 on representations of Islam in
American media (see, for example, Morey and Yaqin 2011; Alsultany 2012; Alsultany
2014)  and in  political  thriller  series  such as  Homeland  (Showtime,  2011-2020),  these
narratives do not figure prominently in most of the scholarly discussions on political
drama series.
2 Many of these shows feature a built-in problem. Since they focus on national security,
international relations, and the business of politics, their engagement with Islam and
representations of Muslims is framed almost solely by issues of U.S. national security
and terrorism (foreign and domestic). One may surmise that this is why the creators of
these series, in order to avoid offense and to offset critique, seem to have resorted to a
set  of  strategies  which  Evelyn  Alsultany  has  termed  “simplified  complex
representations” serving as the typical “representational mode of the so-called post-
race era” (Alsultany 2014: 144). As Alsultany has explained, she is “concerned with the
standardization  of  ‘positive,’  sympathetic  representations  of  Arab  and  Muslim
identities” since these “seemingly positive representations… have helped to form a new
kind of racism, one that projects antiracism and multiculturalism on the surface but
simultaneously produces the logics and affects necessary to legitimate racist policies
and practices” and to “project the United States as an enlightened country that has
entered a postracial  era” (Alsultany 2012:  16).  Although I  share some of Alsultany’s
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concerns, I find the representations of Arabs, Muslims and Muslim countries in some of
these shows more contradictory and complex. As multimedial texts that are receptive
to intermedial aesthetics, television series encourage multiple and contrasting readings
and ideological positionings (see Mehring and Furlanetto, “Introduction”; Rippl 3, 12). I
read political drama series consequently as multivocal texts that, in the words of Frank
Mehring  and  Elena  Furlanetto,  “may  display  dynamics  of  internal  accord  and
disaccord” (see “Introduction”). These dynamics can be related to the serial character
of televisual storytelling, to the particular institutional and political contexts in which
the series emerge, and to long-standing tensions between inclusionist and exclusionist
perspectives on the American nation.
3 In the following, I will focus on this polyvocality regarding representations of Arabs,
Muslims, Muslim countries, and terrorism particularly in The West Wing and 24 (Fox,
2001-2010). As the first TV shows to engage, albeit in differing ways, with the emerging
government policies and public discourses in the wake of 9/11, both contributed in
significant ways to the framing of narratives about Islam and Islamophobia in the first
decade of the twenty-first century. I will explore how polyvocal narratives are brought
across not only on the level of plot and dialogue, but also by way of aesthetic strategies
(camerawork,  soundtrack,  split  screens  and  multiple-frame  compositions)  and
intermedial  references  (newscasts,  satellite  imaging,  cell  phones,  allusions  to  the
interaction of politics and media). I will show how these strategies supply additional
information and textual layers that complicate viewers’ processes of meaning-making
and contribute to in-text dissensus and ideological ambivalence. 
4 Although the scholarly engagement with the politics of The West Wing and 24 might
seem dated in 2020, when the polarization of American politics and the tribalization of
American culture appear to have reached an unprecedented high point, it may make
sense to bring into view again the political and cultural transformations of the late
1990s and  early  2000s  (even  before  9/11).  Both  shows  emerged  in  a  climate  of
increasingly partisan politics, defined by “culture wars,” battles over the meaning and
consequences of globalization, by the challenges of redefining U.S. foreign policy after
the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  and  by  a  controversial  national  election  in  2000.  They
appeared  at  a  time  when  the  televisual  landscape  was  undergoing  shifts  from
broadcasting  to  narrowcasting,  from  a  mass  audience  to  niche  audiences,  from
mainstreaming to streaming. In the chronology of these shifts presented by Amanda D.
Lotz, both shows belong to what she has termed the “multi-channel transition period,”
in between the network era and today’s “post-network era” (ix-x). As network shows,
both reflected the pressure to avoid offense while offering innovative programming. As
transitional  shows,  they  partook  in  changes  underway  in  televisual  modes  of
storytelling and audience address,  in  an industrial  context  where there  was  now a
broader range of viewing audiences “thriving on specialty, distinction, and niche taste”
(39). Both shows segued into new viewing practices (initially mostly defined by DVD)
that  broke  from  linear  programming  schedules  and  that  pushed  the  boundaries
between episodic and serial forms of storytelling (see Lotz 73-4; Mittell 53).
5 The West Wing has received credit for establishing the genre of the political drama series
and for offering a lofty vision of public service at a time when real-life official politics
and politicians had arguably lost  their authoritative power.  The show immersed its
viewers  into  the  daily  flow  of  political  work  behind  the  scenes  in  a  White  House
perpetually  confronted  by  domestic  and  foreign  policy  dilemmas  that  loosely
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referenced real-life historical or current events. In the two seasons of The West Wing
that aired before 9/11, terrorism featured as a marginal plot device. If it became an
issue  at  all,  terrorist  threats  to  the  U.S.  could  be  seen emerging  equally  from
homegrown sources such as white pride (S1E17, S2E2) or eco-terrorism (S2E12) as from
countries identified with Islam (Syria in S1E2). The opening of Season 3 then had to be
postponed because of 9/11. On October 3, 2001, a quickly drafted, stand-alone episode
was  aired  which  indirectly  referenced  9/11  and  stirred  considerable  controversy
among viewers  and  critics.  While  some felt  that  “the  episode  revealed  that  it  was
possible to debate terrorism ‘in a sensitive, sensible and intelligent way’” (McCabe 98)
and that its style of discussion surpassed the quality found on news channels, others
denounced it  as preachy, “overly didactic” (Takacs 54) and unable “to conceive the
complexities of the Middle East in anything other than Western terms” (Steven Aoun,
qtd. in McCabe 99). Stacy Takacs has argued that the episode “pathologized terrorism,
promoted  ‘American  innocence,’  and  disciplined  its  audience  to  embrace  social
authority as a condition of ‘American’ identity” (47). 
6 Called “Isaac and Ishmael,” this episode serves as my first example to illustrate how a
televisual text creates a sense of in-text dissensus that may lead to more ambivalent
ideological projections than those suggested, for example, by Aoun and Takacs. The
episode  features  two  storylines.  While  one  storyline  focuses  on  the  White  House
hosting a visiting group of racially diverse high school students, in a parallel story an
Arab American staffer  is  suspected of  working with Islamic extremists  planning an
attack in the U.S.  The White House is  in lockdown mode. Two parallel,  intertwined
storylines present, on the one hand, the conversation that White House staffers and the
President have with the visiting students (a classroom situation), and on the other the
racial profiling and interrogation of the Arab American. The two storylines challenge
each other. One of them can be read as Orientalist, the other as post-Orientalist or anti-
racist.
7 In the first storyline, the White House staffers stage a teach-in for a captive audience of
students  and  viewers  alike.  Each  of  the  fictional  characters  represents  a  different
position on the relations between Islam, U.S. culture, U.S. foreign policy, and terrorism
which  were  at  the  center  of  American  public  narratives  about  9/11.  Deputy  White
House Chief of Staff Josh Lyman compares Islamic extremists to the KKK (“the Klan
gone medieval and global”) and calls Islamic fundamentalism a “cultural wasteland.”
The Jewish-American communications director Toby Ziegler (Richard Schiff) sees the
terrorists on the same level as Nazis (“When you think of the Taliban, think of the
Nazis”) while deputy communications director Sam Seaborn (Rob Lowe) is convinced
that  terrorism is  rooted in  eleventh-century  Islamic  culture  and is  thus  inherently
foreign to America. All of the voices imply that Islam, terrorism, and the opposition to
pluralism and freedom are un-American, alien, and external to the U.S. Cultural studies
scholar Stacy Takacs has therefore argued that these voices all relate terrorism to a
violent cultural disposition rather than to concrete political grievances (53). However,
these grievances are addressed by the personal aide to the president, African American
Charlie Young (Dulé Hill), who sees a link between poverty and terrorism and draws
connections to domestic forms of racial violence. In addition, Josh Lyman acknowledges
the  legitimacy  of  grievances  about  U.S.  foreign  policy  when  he  suggests  that  “it’s
probably a good idea to acknowledge that they have specific complaints. I hear them
every  day—The  people  we  support,  troops  in  Saudi  Arabia,  sanctions  against  Iraq,
support of Egypt.” Since all of these voices somehow aim to represent the wide and
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contradictory range of public narratives about 9/11, I would argue, this storyline of the
episode  may  have  left  viewers  to  ponder  multiple,  implicitly  also  contradictory,
political perspectives. 
8 The second storyline, which focuses on the interrogation of the Muslim staffer, exposes
the interrogators’ racist disposition and brings into view the aggression that Muslims
in the U.S. have been subjected to before and after 9/11. It shows what happens “when
Americans abandon tolerance in the pursuit of security” (Takacs 50) and suggests that
threat  cannot  be  read  from  ethnicity  or  religious  affiliation  (Holland  91).  The
contradiction between the two storylines is mediated not only on the level of dialogue,
but is also made visible by way of casting choices and staging. Thus a visual pan of the
students  visiting the White House reveals  their  diversity—male and female,  African
American, white, Hispanic, Asian. Also, the interrogation of the Muslim staffer is staged
in dark tones, evoking a sense of claustrophobia and paranoia. The fact that a respected
fictional character, Chief of Staff Leo McGarry (John Spencer),  is chosen to lead the
interrogation in a manner that seems to be out of character for him, underscores the
disruptive nature of the event. The two conflicting stories thus illustrate how the show
deliberately  stages  an  in-text  dissensus  by  exposing  the  contradictions  within  the
American national identity discourse, between an inclusionist civic and an exclusionist
racialized nationalism, a tension that Trevor and Shawn Parry-Giles have identified as
central to The West Wing as a whole (17). 
9 As critics have pointed out, the episode does not encourage any real engagement with
Islam as a religion (Spigel 244) but rather foregrounds politicized forms of Islam that
may threaten U.S. national security. Yet I would argue that the episode, like the series
as  a  whole,  stages  relevant  discussions  rather  than  simply  “staging  an  illusion  of
political debates” (Takacs 47). The polyvocality that the episode displays may be more
facile  than that  usually  displayed in The West  Wing where Steadicam tracking shots
follow  staffers  walking  and  talking  through  the  halls,  discussing  and  deliberating
political issues from all possible sides, thus making visible the workings of a democracy
(McCabe  63-4).  By  framing  9/11  as  an  attack  on  U.S.  freedom  and  pluralism  and
deeming  critical  questions  of  past  U.S.  policies  mostly  off-limits,  the  episode  may
represent the discursive limitations and pressures hovering over the first days after
9/11. However, as Trevor and Shawn Parry-Giles have argued, it “offered a different
discourse than those offered by President Bush and other public officials. It presented a
dialogic  rhetoric  that  symbolically  invited  participation and disputation”  about  the
threats confronting the U.S., although it “still located the power to define and respond
to national trauma in the White House” (160). They suggest that with its “pluralistic
polyvalence” (166) the episode “self-reflexively questions the ethnocentrism inherent
in the conventional American mantra about freedom and democracy” (163). Especially
the  second  plotline  “questions  the  simplistic  civic  nationalism  at  work  in  political
culture following 9/11 and gives voice to the racialized and gendered quality of U.S.
nationalism” (164). 
10 As a whole,  I  would argue,  The West  Wing discussed the politics related to Muslims,
Muslim Americans and Muslim countries in a way that could lead to informed debates,
taking  into  account  multiple  perspectives  by  utilizing  a  large  ensemble  cast  (of
admittedly limited diversity with regard to gender and race).  Most of the time this
takes place in the form of dialogues and arguments between the main characters. Thus
one character  argues:  “The U.S.  Constitution defends  religious  pluralism.  It  doesn’t
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reduce all of Islam to fanaticism” (S3E14), stirring a debate about the complexity of the
constitutional relationship between politics and religion. Characters discuss issues and
ventilate  ideas,  casting  different  knowledges  and  perspectives  on  Islam,  Islamic
cultures and geographies in the form of argument and dissent. The show especially
stages debates about the relation of Islam to Western conceptions of state and society.
Recurring storylines decry Islamic law as a source of oppression, especially of women.
Thus,  the  female  White  House  Press  Secretary  C.J.  Cregg  responds  in  an
uncharacteristically emotional way to the news that Saudi school girls had died in a fire
because  they  had  been  prevented  by  the  religious  police  from  leaving  a  burning
building as they were not seen to be appropriately dressed (S3E19). The series here
references a real-life event that drew international attention in March 2002. 
11 Yet the show also comments critically upon the idea of a U.S. intervention into Muslim
countries’ internal affairs, thus engaging with the real-life public political discourse on
the invasion of Iraq as it unfolded in 2002 and 2003. At the end of Season 3 (aired in
May  2002),  fictional  President  Jed  Bartlet  (Martin  Sheen)  sanctions  the  covert
assassination of the defense minister of the fictional Islamic Republic of Qumar who
allegedly sponsored a planned attack within the U.S. In the course of seasons 4 and 5
this leads not only to cover-ups and guilt  on the part of  the president,  but also to
controversial debates about the logic of toppling a “moderate Islamic regime” (S5E1)
and about the problematic role of U.S.  policies in the Middle East (S5E9, S5E10).  By
Season 5 (aired from late 2003 through early 2004) it has become increasingly difficult
for the Bartlet administration to assess whether a protest in an Islamic country (to be
witnessed on TV news screens) is part of a fundamentalist or a nascent democratic
movement (see, for example, S5E10). In its representations of a fictional U.S. policy in
the Middle East, the series mediates real-world discussions both by inventing entire
countries such as Qumar and referencing real places, events (such as the plight of the
Saudi school girls mentioned above) and real-life U.S. relations with Muslim countries.
But  it  is  not  very  consistent  here.  Although  the  fictionalization  of  Qumar  may  be
interpreted as an instance of Orientalism in the way the series imagines the country as
a foreign “other,” one could also read it as a dramatic serial device to critically address
real-life U.S. foreign policy involvement in the Middle East that includes the support of
Saudi Arabia, the issue of state-supported terrorism, questions of human rights (also
with relation to gender) and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
12 In fact, by the fall of 2003, The West Wing created a counter-narrative to the real-life
invasion of Iraq earlier that year, imagining an alternative U.S. policy in the Middle
East.  Although  the  dramatic  action  takes  place  in  Gaza  and  involves  the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the series recreates a threat situation that resembles that of the
U.S.  after  9/11,  discussing  whether  the  administration  should  react  (like  the  Bush
administration) with retaliatory strikes,  despite insufficient intelligence. In the end,
President Bartlet resists the calls for military action also within his staff (S5E21, S5E22,
S6E1, S6E2). While the series here very obviously references the Bush administration’s
invasion of Iraq, it uses this imaginary counter-scenario also to address another real-
life  conflict  by  reenacting  a  Middle  East  peace  conference  at  Camp  David.  It  thus
reminds viewers of the historical role of the U.S. as a peace broker that brought Israelis
and Palestinians  to a  table.  In  this  context,  the  series  has  the  characters  render  a
political debate that considers as many perspectives as possible. Viewers are involved
in  the  process  of  meaning-making by  being presented with  a  multimedial  array  of
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dialogues,  conversations  and  images,  including  TV  newscasts,  that  heighten
understanding, but that also leave much space for interpretation, consent and dissent.
13 Ambivalences are generated also by the way The West Wing embeds or buries stories
about Islam and Islamophobia within narratives about U.S. political cultures. Thus, in
some  plotlines,  the  correlation  made  within  the  administration  between  Islamic
countries and terrorism is revealed to be false and home-grown sources of terrorism
and danger need to be considered (see S3E18). While this diversification of the “enemy”
in surprising plot turns may be explained by TV seriality’s inherent need for variation,
it  still  comes across  as  a  deliberate  political  choice  made by  the  series  creators  to
engage  critically  with  real-life  Islamophobic  tendencies.  In  Season  5,  for  example,
proselytizing  Christian  missionaries  are  seen  to  be  more  of  a  problem  for  the
administration than Islamic law (S5E9). Here, the administration is confronted with the
hatred  against  Arab  American  immigrants.  It  reacts  to  Islamophobic  attacks  on
naturalization ceremonies by having the events held in the White House (S5E3). We also
hear a Supreme Court justice prepare a brief  regarding the racial  profiling of  Arab
Americans, in which the plight of Muslims is compared to that of Japanese Americans
after  Pearl  Harbor  (S5E7).  In  Season  7  the  story  of  a religiously  motivated  suicide
bomber is embedded within episodes that center on the way the religious right in the
U.S. is trying to manipulate a presidential campaign. By pairing these stories, the series
creates an equation between Islamic fundamentalism and Christian fundamentalism as
similar phenomena. It thus picks up the critique of racial profiling and Islamophobia in
the U.S. that had been voiced in the “Isaac and Ishmael” episode opening Season 3.
These micronarratives seem to disrupt other messages that tend to conflate Islamic
countries  and  terrorism.  Although the  show at  times  does  not  seem to  go  beyond
binary “notions of  either  patriotism or  victimization” (Alsultany,  “Representations”
150),  and although it  tends  to  conflate  Arab ethnicity  and the  religion of  Islam,  it
nevertheless  challenges  these  binaries  and  conflations  in  the  way  it  intertwines
multiple stories and discourses. 
14 The West Wing clearly foregrounds language and reflects on language use in its attempt
to bring across multiple, often contradictory perspectives and political positions. Yet, it
is not only dialogues and conversations that challenge viewers, confronting them with
an excess of information. Meaning-making is additionally complicated by “a constant
interplay between multiple televisions tuned to the different news channels,  full  of
sound bites, spin, and spectacle” (McCabe 69). TV newscasts and press conferences held
in the White House, in which conflicting positions both within the administration and
within the various media outlets come to the fore, show how the series includes and
uses references to the print and news media to illustrate the processes and problems of
a democratic  discourse.  These may include spin,  image control,  and the framing of
issues  by  the  administration.  But  they  also  include  the  conundrum  that  the
administration often only learns about events by watching CNN (which reflects  the
particular mediascape and its impact on U.S. politics in the early 2000s). White House
staffers and administration are seen to be in constant interaction with media that both
supply  needed information and complicate  political  work.  These  media  include the
print media, broadcast news channels, and talk shows on radio and TV. For the viewer,
these intermedial references may add to the impression of an in-text dissensus, for
example  in  S5E10,  when  both  fictional  characters  and  viewers  watch  newscasts  of
protests unfolding in the Middle East. Here the series stages a discussion held by White
House staffers as well as former and present U.S. presidents around the links between
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monarchic systems, Islamic law, colonialism, U.S. policy and democracy in the Middle
East. In the end, the issues are left open for viewers to ponder. 
15 Subtextual commentary adding to in-text dissensus may at times also be provided by
non-diegetic  music.  Thus  S5E1  ends  with  a  song  (“Sanvean”  sung  by  Lisa  Gerrard)
played  over  a  montage  of  scenes,  all  picturing  unrelated  dramatic  personal  and
political events that unfold simultaneously and that include both the kidnapping of
President  Bartlet’s  daughter  and  a  U.S.  airstrike  on  terrorist  training  camps  in  a
fictional state in the Middle East. While the storyline draws on viewers’ sympathy for
the President’s family and demonizes an abstract “terrorist” enemy, the mournful song
that  evokes  associations  with  “Oriental” music  provides  an  affective  counterpoint,
lamenting the loss of lives and human suffering on all sides.
16 All of these examples may support the argument that the series stirs a sense of in-text
dissensus not only on the level of plot and dialogue, but also on the level of aesthetic
techniques and intermedial references. In addition, as McCabe and Frame have shown,
these techniques underwent a significant change over the program’s run. Frame argues
that the series’ politics “evolved in response to the seismic, almost simultaneous shocks
to  its  liberal  ethos”  provided  by  the  transition  from  the  Clinton  to  the  Bush
administration  and  by  9/11  (117-118).  He  identifies  a  change  from  representing
“America’s confident post-Cold War attitude towards incursions in foreign lands” (124)
to a “re-evaluation of the president’s role in the post-Cold War political environment”
(125) and a post-9/11 narrative in which the president’s movement over to the “dark
side”  (of  the  “war  on  terror”)  is  visualized,  for  example,  by  changes  in  lighting
(131-137).  Other medial  innovations include the use of  the handheld camera in the
episodes  dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  discussed above (S5E21,  S5E22,
S6E1, S6E2), illustrating “the inability of the president to control unpredictable global
events  in  the  post-9/11  environment”  and  “lending  not  only  a  feeling  of
(manufactured) liveness to proceedings, but also an overwhelming sense of uncertainty
and fear” (139). As an “aesthetic shorthand for ‘breaking news,’” Frame suggests, the
shaky mobile camera may also reflect changes in the media environment after 9/11
where news and entertainment conflated in unprecedented ways (140). All in all “the
changes in visual style and tone can be understood as a subtle critique of Bush’s ‘war on
terror’” and as a complication of the Bush administration’s “‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy”
(171).
17 Hence, The West Wing can be read as a text that leaves space for interpretation and
ideological  ambiguity  with  regard  to  the  representation  of  Islam,  Islamophobia,
Muslims and Muslim countries. This ambiguity, which leads to the impression of an in-
text dissensus, may have various sources. It may reflect the contradictions within an
American national identity discourse. It can be related to the mechanisms of a “serially
unfolding television narrative” (Kelleter 75) which is dynamic and evolving, “favoring
ongoing variations, increasing entanglements, and ever deeper complications” (60). It
may also be related to the pressures working within network television where a show
might want to appeal to both sides of the political aisle at first and then cater to a more
liberal  niche  audience.  As  McCabe  has  observed,  the  series  initially  attempted  to
balance political debate, also to “stave off accusations that the show had too liberal a
slant” (13). In some cases (as in the “Isaac and Ishmael” episode), polyvocality was the
result of deliberate staging by the series creators who may have wanted to create a
complex text, also with regard to capturing the complexities of the political issues that
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were addressed. In addition, changes in the show’s politics over its run need to be taken
into account. All of this may work against the argument that these representations of
Islam,  Muslims and Muslim countries  operate  in  the  service  of  “racist  policies  and
practices” (Alsultany, “Representations” 144).
18 Watching the first season of Designated Survivor in 2016, viewers might have been struck
by  the  strong  critical  focus  this  season  laid  on  Islamophobic  politics  and  violence
within the U.S. while it recreated a 9/11 moment. This is especially interesting since
the ABC show is regarded as a successor series to 24 (with Kiefer Sutherland as lead
actor  in  both  programs)  which  has  been  accused  of  supporting,  if  not  creating,
Islamophobia.  24  is  both  a  political  drama  and  an  action  drama  centering  on
Sutherland’s character Jack Bauer, an agent of the U.S. government’s Counter Terrorist
Unit (CTU) who in each season races a ticking clock to subvert impending terrorist
attacks  on the United States  and the various  presidents  during a  twenty-four-hour
state of  emergency.  The series is  thus part of  the genre of  “terrordrama” that was
increasingly popular after 9/11 (McCullough 2), reflecting and creating a permanent
sense of mistrust and paranoia. People are never what they seem to be, and it takes a
whole season to understand the identity of the perpetrators. Since the main subject of
24 is the threat to U.S. national security, Muslims, Muslim Americans, Islamic cultures
and geographies are addressed only within this context. Yet the series creators have
clearly tried to counter critiques of supporting Islamophobia by resorting to a number
of  strategies that  fit  what  Evelyn  Alsultany  has  identified  as  “simplified  complex
representations” (Alsultany, “Representations” 144-149) and that could also be found in
The West Wing.
19 Among these are,  first,  the rotation or  diversification of  the identity  of  the enemy
threatening U.S. national security. Thus, the threats may come from Balkan villains
(Season 1), Mexicans (Season 3), Africans (Sesason 7), Russians (Season 8), or American
patriot  groups  (Season  7).  Although  it  seems  that  Arabs  or  Muslims  represent  the
majority of terrorist suspects,  if  not perpetrators,  in this series,  most of the scripts
reveal white male government authority or executives in the oil and private security
industries  as  motive forces behind the plots.  However,  as  in The West  Wing,  Islamic
countries are connected to political disorder, Arab ethnicity and the religion of Islam
are conflated.
20 As a “highly serialized” (Lotz 73) text, 24 uses ambiguities and complications to suspend
the stories’ final outcomes. Multiple layers of truth are only gradually revealed. This
specific form of serial storytelling also impacts viewers’ ideological meaning-making
processes. Thus there are so many plot twists and turns, so many people involved in the
plots  against  America,  that  the  stereotype  of  the  Arab/Muslim terrorist  “other”  is
neutralized.  Viewers  are  coopted  into  producing  “connections  between  Middle
Easterners, Arabs, Islam, and terrorism” (Takacs 91), only to learn that these suspects
are “merely pawns or a front for Euro-American or European terrorists. The identity of
the  enemy  is  thus  flipped”  (Alsultany,  “Representations”  146).  For  every  “foreign”
enemy there is a “domestic” one. For example, in Season 2, after suspicion had fallen on
an  Iranian  bridegroom,  it  is  his  blonde-haired,  blue-eyed  American  bride  who  is
revealed to have colluded with terrorists, for reasons that are not quite clear (S2E10).
“Good”  characters  may  be  misrecognized as  “bad”  and  vice  versa.  The  show
consequently performs a balancing act,  representing ethnic and religious difference
but seemingly refraining from value judgments and leaving viewers to do the work. As
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Stacy Takacs has argued, the show’s “penchant for visual and narrative excess provides
the  necessary  space  for  the  entertainment  of  multiple  points  of  view and political
perspectives, but it does so in a way that devolves responsibility onto the atomized
viewers and fans of the show” (92). Takacs further contends that the show implicates
viewers “in the construction of meaning” (90) in a manner that makes them “complicit
in the construction of the ideological norms the show advances” (91).
21 A second strategy is that for every “bad” Arab or Muslim there is a “good” Arab or
Muslim American character ready to fight for the U.S. Islam is “portrayed as inspiring
American patriotism as opposed to inspiring terrorism” (Alsultany, “Representations”
145). In Season 2, an Imam is heard condemning any crimes committed in the name of
Islam (S2E12). In Season 4 two Arab American brothers who have been subjected to
Islamophobia speak out against the conflation of Islam and terrorism and assist Jack
Bauer in his fight against the bad guys (S4E13). Yet the show also briefly breaks through
the binary of either patriotism or victimization in a scene where an Arab perpetrator
becomes the victim of Black Islamophobia (S4E5). The problematic distinction between
“good” and “bad” Arab/Muslim is then illuminated when the Arab/Muslim leader of a
terror cell explains his actions by pointing to injustices perpetrated by the U.S. against
“his  people.”  We hear his  warning:  “Renounce your imperialist  policies” (S4E19)  or
“pay the price for your government’s policy…. Renounce your policies of imperialism
and  interventionist  activities”  (S4E20).  When  he  is  captured  and  interrogated,  his
grievances are acknowledged by Jack Bauer who asks him what he wants to change for
“his people.” The man answers: “I already have” (meaning he has set a plot in motion
to  destroy  the  U.S.)  and  he  adds:  “Besides,  your  president  sees  me  only  in  one
dimension. Evil.” Jack Bauer answers: “As you see us” (S4E22). Nevertheless, even if the
imperial character of U.S. foreign policy is briefly acknowledged, the grievances the
man has with the U.S. are articulated so vaguely and with so much hatred that his
complaints lose credibility and legitimacy.
22 A  further  strategy that  creates  ideological  ambivalence  is  the  series’  tendency  to
implicate the Washington political establishment as a potential source of threat. The
U.S. government (including its Counter Terrorist Unit) is revealed as morally flawed,
ineffective, even corrupt. Government agents like Bauer are subjected to government
injustice and are, in the perspective of the Washington establishment, as expendable as
the  enemy  “other.”  Hence,  Muslims  and  Islamic  countries  have  no  monopoly  on
conspiracies and violent plots in this series. Although viewers, especially in the wake of
9/11,  may  have  become  used  to  the  entertainment  of  associations  between  Islam,
Arabs,  Arab Americans and terrorism, the show rather disabuses them of these too
simple associations. It counters its own “Islamophobic reputation” (McCullough 43) by
creating a “polysemic, variable, and often incoherent” (75) text that is “riddled with
ideological contradictions” (77).
23 In fact, Islamophobia is only a minor part of the culture of suspicion and paranoia that
is recreated and evoked in a series where no character can be trusted, not even within
the CTU, and things are never what they seem. 24 evokes this sense of paranoia and
disorientation on an aesthetic level by resorting to medial techniques associated with
live  broadcasts.  As  McCullough  has  suggested,  24 borrows  “techniques  from  action
news,  reality  television,  and  sports  coverage…  in  order  to  intensify  audience
engagement”  (1).  The  use  of  handheld,  shaky  cameras  creates  a  “live  effect”  that
“contributes to a sense of urgency,” but also reinforces the disorientation and distrust
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evoked by the constant plot twists and turns that throw characters and viewers off-
course. Split screens and multiple frames encourage “comparisons between different
characters’ reactions to the same events, revealing important information about them”
(50), and yet viewers are still left with the work to actively “stitch the various pieces of
information together into a meaningful  whole” (Takacs 89).  Other media producing
additional information are cell phones and screens showing images from satellites and
surveillance cameras. These videographic elements are supplemented by “text printed
on screens including digital time clocks and readouts; and… endless images of screens”
(McCullough  63).  This  excess  of  visual  information  adds  to  the  “entertainment  of
multiple  points  of  view  and  political  perspectives”  (Takacs  92)  and  “makes
identification difficult” for the viewer (McCullough 63).
24 Additional textual layers that may intensify in-text dissensus are brought across by the
use  of  lighting,  color,  soundtrack and music.  In  24,  sound design and music  create
parallels between the characters’ and the viewers’ search for information (Takacs 89).
However,  as  McCullough  has  rightly  argued,  music  “rarely  contradicts  the  goal  of
establishing character motivation and story development” (66). Music and soundtrack
may support  the visual  information by creating “stereotypical  associations between
characters or locations and musical themes” (66-7). “Oriental” music often underscores
the  sense  of difference and threat  tied  to  spaces  and characters,  including Muslim
spaces such as cities and mosques, for instance in S2E11. However, there are also a few
instances in which music may provide a subtextual counterpoint to what is witnessed
on screen. Thus, in S4E5 ‘Oriental’ music lends a note of tragedy to the death of an Arab
American  that  had  colluded  with  a  terrorist  group.  Musical  associations  implicitly
undercut the triumphalist impulses that may have been encouraged by the storyline. 
25 Hence, both The West Wing and 24 can be read against the grain—and against the more
critical readings provided by some scholars—as contradictory texts that both reflect
and expose Islamophobia. Since the storylines about Islamic cultures and geographies
are never unrelated to contexts of national security, they may reflect the automatism
of the links created between Islamic countries and threats to national security. At the
same time, American Islamophobic behavior within the U.S. is exposed as implicitly un-
American. Both The West Wing and 24 can be read as texts that feature in-text dissensus
not only on the level of plot and dialogue, but also on the level of aesthetic strategies
and intermedial references that heighten viewers’ understanding but that also leave
much space for interpretation, consent and dissent. As polyvocal serial texts that leave
viewers to ponder a range of perspectives and political positions, they are ideologically
more ambivalent than is suggested by scholars who see the series advancing “a new
kind  of  racism”  or  contributing  to  a  “multicultural  post-race  illusion”  (Alsultany,
“Representations” 144). In their ambivalence they rather seem to expose long-standing
tensions  within  American  identity  discourses  between  a  civic  inclusionist  and  a
racialized exclusionist nationalism that particularly came to the fore in the days after
9/11.  Both  shows  reflect,  but  at  times  also  transcend,  the  discursive  norms  and
limitations of  their  time,  the first  decade of  a  new century,  and of  their  industrial
contexts. Both emerged in a mediascape in which HBO, cable and DVDs began to define
the production and reception of TV shows before streaming and streaming platforms
appeared. However, in its multimedia textual structure, especially 24 already manifests
and  anticipates  shifts  in  the  mediascape  that  have  come  to  define  the  industrial
contexts and forms of televisual storytelling that we know today.
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ABSTRACTS
Since The West Wing (NBC, 1999-2006), the political drama series has been a proliferating format
for fictional engagements with American politics. Georgi-Findlay focuses on how The West Wing
and 24 (Fox, 2001-2010) engage public narratives about Islam and Islamophobia, arguing that the
shows go beyond what Evelyn Alsultany has termed “simplified complex representations” by
creating  contradictory,  multivocal  texts  that  display  dynamics of  internal  disaccord.
Representations of Arabs, Muslims and Muslim countries are embedded within storylines that
challenge  each  other.  Especially  The  West  Wing stages  discussions  that  can  lead  to  informed
debates,  reflecting  and  exposing  the  contradictions  within  the  American  national  identity
discourse between an inclusionist civic and an exclusionist racialized nationalism. In both series,
polyvocal narratives are brought across not only by intertwining multiple discourses, but also by
way  of  aesthetic  strategies  and  intermedial  references  that  supply  additional  textual  layers,
complicating viewers’ processes of meaning-making and contributing to in-text dissensus and
ideological  ambivalences.  Both  series  thus  can  be  read  against  the  grain,  as  contradictory,
multivocal texts that both reflect and expose Islamophobia. 
INDEX
Keywords: Orientalism, Multimedia, Islamophobia, Hollywood, Historical Film
AUTHOR
BRIGITTE GEORGI-FINDLAY
Brigitte Georgi-Findlay is professor of North American Studies at the TU Dresden. Her
publications include two monographs on Native American literature and one on The Frontiers of
Women’s Writing: Women’s Narratives and the Rhetoric of Westward Expansion (University of Arizona
Press). In recent years, she has focused on Western films and Western television series, and has
worked and published on recent series such as Deadwood, Hell on Wheels, The Walking Dead, 
Westworld, but also on “old” Western series such as Gunsmoke and Bonanza.
Inter/Multimedial Constructions of Islam in Post-9/11 TV Series: The West Win...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
12
